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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a cooperative approach
to improve the security of both primary and secondary systems
in cognitive radio multicast communications. During their access
to the frequency spectrum licensed to the primary users, the
secondary unlicensed users assist the primary system in fortifying
security by sending a jamming noise to the eavesdroppers,
while simultaneously protect themselves from eavesdropping.
The main objective of this work is to maximize the secrecy
rate of the secondary system, while adhering to all individ-
ual primary users’ secrecy rate constraints. In the case of
passive eavesdroppers and imperfect channel state information
knowledge at the transceivers, the utility function of interest is
nonconcave and involved constraints are nonconvex, and thus,
the optimal solutions are troublesome. To address this problem,
we propose an iterative algorithm to arrive at a local optimum
of the considered problem. The proposed iterative algorithm is
guaranteed to achieve a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, physical layer (PHY) security for wireless com-
munications has become an important research area. The
underlying idea is to guarantee a positive secrecy rate of
legitimate users by exploiting the random characteristics of
the wireless channel. In particular, the authors in [1] proposed
a low-complexity on/off power allocation strategy to attain
secrecy under the assumption of full channel state information
(CSI). The use of cooperative jamming noise (JN) was pro-
posed in [2], where users who are prevented from transmitting
according to a certain policy will block the eavesdropper
and thereby assist the remaining users. From a quality-of-
service perspective, a secret transmit beamforming approach
was considered in [3], in order to predetermine the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) target at the destination
and/or at the eavesdropper.
Being a critical issue, PHY security of cognitive radio
networks (CRNs), which are faced with specific security
risks due to the broadcasting nature of radio signals [4]–
[6], however, has not been well investigated until recently,
e.g., in [7]–[11]. More specifically, in [7] and [8], multi-
antennas at the secondary transmitter were utilized to attain
beamforming that maximizes the secrecy capacity of the
secondary system, while adhering to the peak interference
constraint at the primary receiver. Furthermore, a simple case
with single antenna at the eavesdropper was considered in [9].
In [10], the authors considered a CRN model, where both
the primary user (PU) and the secondary user (SU) send their
confidential messages to intended receivers that are surrounded
by a single eavesdropper.
In this paper, we consider the PHY security in cooperative
cognitive radio multicast communications, where the eaves-
droppers intend to wiretap data from both the primary and
secondary systems. We assume that the primary transmitter
is equipped only with a single antenna, which implies that
the primary transmitter cannot generate a jamming signal
or design a beamforming vector to protect itself from the
eavesdroppers. The secrecy capacity of the primary system is
improved by implementing a cooperative framework between
the primary and secondary systems. Specifically, the primary
allows the secondary system to share its spectrum, and in
return the secondary system sends jamming noise to degrade
the eavesdropper’s channel, in order to protect the primary
system. Specifically, the main contributions of this paper can
be summarized as follows:
• We design a joint information and jamming signal at the
secondary transmitter, where information is intended for
secondary receivers and jamming noise is intended for
eavesdroppers. The main objective is to maximize the
secrecy rate of the secondary system, while satisfying
the minimum secrecy rate requirement for each legiti-
mate user of the primary system as well as the power
constraint.
• We propose a method to find the approximate solution
for optimal transmit beamforming, by providing the con-
vexity of the problem that is considered through the
use of a convex approximation. The optimal solutions
of transmit beamforming for the confidential information
and jamming noise do not fix the transmit strategy.
• We provide extensive numerical results to justify the
novelty of the proposed algorithm and compare its per-
formance with the known solutions. In particular, the
numerical results demonstrate fast convergence of the
proposed algorithm and significantly improve the secrecy
rate compared with the known solutions. We should
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Figure 1. A cooperative CRN multicast transmission model with multiple
eavesdroppers.
remark that our results are more general than in [10],
which was considered under the assumptions of one
eavesdropper and perfect CSI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
A. System Model
The primary system consists of one primary transmitter (PT)
and L primary receivers (PRs), while the secondary system
consists of one secondary transmitter (ST) and M secondary
receivers (SRs), as illustrated in Fig. 1. The ST, which is
a base station (BS), is equipped with N antennas, whereas
all other nodes are equipped with only one antenna. The
opportunistic spectrum access is improved by assigning the
ST to send G information bearing signals sg, g = 1, · · · , G,
where sg is the information being sent to the g-th group
with unit average power E{|sg|
2} = 1. We assume that each
individual multicast group Gg in the secondary system consists
of Mg the secondary receivers. Specifically, the number of
SRs in group Gg is denoted by Sg = {1, · · · ,mg, · · · ,Mg}.
Then, the total number of SRs in the secondary system with
multicast transmission is indeed M =
∑G
g=1Mg. Regarding
security, we assume that the eavesdroppers (Eves) potentially
intend to wiretap and decode confidential messages from both
the primary and secondary systems [12]. We assume that
each group Gg and the PRs are respectively wiretapped by
a set of Eves such as Ke,g , {1, · · · , kg, · · · ,Kg}, ∀g and
Kp , {1, · · · , kp, · · · ,Kp}. This implies that at the same
time, each legitimate user is wiretapped by a separate group
of Eves.
We aim to design multiple beamforming vectors at the
ST, one for the JN and the other for its own information
signal, to protect both the primary and secondary systems.
The transmit power at the PT is Pp > 0 and the data intended
for the PR is xp with unit average power E{|xp|
2} = 1.
Before transmission, the data of the SRs sg in the group Gg
is weighted to the N × 1 beamforming vector wg , ∀g. Hence,
all the transmitted signals at the ST can be expressed through
a vector xs as
xs =
G∑
g=1
wgsg + u (1)
where u is the artificial noise vector, whose elements are
zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables with covari-
ance matrix UUH , such that u ∼ CN (0,UUH), where
U ∈ CN×N . The artificial noise u is assumed to be unknown
to all SRs, PRs, and Eves. For notational simplicity, we define
w , [wT1 ,w
T
2 , · · · ,w
T
G]
T ∈ CNG×1.
The corresponding SINR at the l-th PR for l = 1, · · · , L
and the kp-th Eve for kp = 1, · · · ,Kp are respectively given
by1
Γp,l(w,U) =
Pp|hl|
2∑G
g=1 |f
H
l wg|
2 + ‖fHl U‖
2 + σ2l
(2)
Γe,kp(w,U) =
Pp|gkp |
2∑G
g=1 |f
H
kp
wg|2 + ‖fHkpU‖
2 + σ2kp
(3)
where hl ∈ C, gkp ∈ C, fl ∈ C
N×1, and fkp ∈ C
N×1 are the
respective baseband equivalent channels of the links PT → l-
th PR, PT → kp-th Eve, ST → l-th PR, and ST → kp-th Eve.
σ2l and σ
2
kp
are the variance of the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at the l-th PR and kp-th Eve, respectively.
The respective SINR at the mg-th SR in the group Gg and
the kg-th Eve are given by
Γs,mg(w,U) =
|hHmgwg|
2∑G
i=1,i6=g |h
H
mgwi|
2 + ‖hHmgU‖
2 + Pp|fmg |
2 + σ2mg
(4)
Γe,kg (w,U) =
|gHkgwg|
2∑G
i=1,i6=g |g
H
kg
wi|2 + ‖gHkgU‖
2 + Pp|fkg |
2 + σ2kg
(5)
where hmg ∈ C
N×1, gkg ∈ C
N×1, fmg ∈ C, and fkg ∈ C are
the corresponding baseband equivalent channels of the links
ST → mg-th SR, ST → kg-th Eve, PT → mg-th SR, PT →
kg-th Eve. σ
2
mg and σ
2
kg
are the variance of AWGN at the
mg-th PR and kg-th Eve, respectively.
The achievable secrecy rate for the l-th PR of the primary
system, denoted by Cp,l(w,U), can be expressed as [1]
Cp,l(w,U) =
[
log2
(
1 + Γp,l(w,U)
)
− max
kp∈Kp
log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)]+ (6)
where [x]
+
= max {0, x}. The achievable secrecy rate for the
mg-th SR of the secondary system, denoted by Cs,mg (w,U),
can be expressed as [1]
Cs,mg (w,U) =
[
log2
(
1 + Γs,mg(w,U)
)
− max
kg∈Ke,g
log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)]+
.
(7)
1‖ · ‖ and | · | denote the Euclidean norm of a matrix or vector and the
magnitude of a complex scalar, respectively.
B. Optimization Problem Formulation
The objective of the system design is to maximize the min-
imum (max-min) secrecy rate of the secondary system while
satisfying the minimum quality-of-service (QoS) requirements,
such as the secrecy rate achievable for the primary system as
follows
P.1 : max
w,U
min
mg∈Sg,g∈G
Cs,mg (w,U) (8a)
s. t. Cp,l(w,U) ≥ R¯p,l, l ∈ L (8b)∑G
g=1
‖wg‖
2 + ‖U‖2 ≤ Ps (8c)
where L , {1, · · · , L} and G , {1, · · · , G}. In (8b), R¯p,l > 0
are the minimum secrecy rate requirement for each legitimate
user of the primary system.
C. CSI Model
We consider a realistic scenario, where the instantaneous
CSI between ST and PRs is imperfect and Eves are passive.
Specifically, the CSI of the link between the ST and PRs is
given as [13]
fl = fˆl +∆fl, ∀l
Ωl , {∆fl ∈ C
N×1 : ∆fHl ∆fl ≤ δ
2
l }
(9)
where fˆl is the channel estimate of the l-th PR available
at the ST, and ∆fl represents the associated CSI error. For
notational simplicity, we define Ωl as a set of all possible
CSI errors associated with the l-th PR. We assume that ∆fl
are deterministic and bounded, and therefore δl represents the
size of the uncertainty region of the estimated CSI of the l-th
PR.
For the passive Eves, we further assume that the entries of
gkp , fkp , ∀kp, fkg , and gkg , ∀kg , follow independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading, and that the
instantaneous CSI of these wiretap channels is not available
at ST. These assumptions of passive Eves are commonly
used in the literature [9], [13], [14]. Meanwhile, the channels
hmg , ∀m, g, are assumed to be perfectly known since the SRs
are active users in the secondary system.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we propose an iterative algorithm that arrives
a local optimum of the considered optimization problem. As
the first step, we convert (8) to another equivalent form as
maximize
w,U,t,z
min
mg∈Sg,g∈G
{
log2
(
1 + Γs,mg (w,U)
)
−tg
}
(10a)
s. t. log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
≤ tg, kg ∈ Ke,g, g ∈ G (10b)
log2
(
1 + Γp,l(w,U)
)
− z ≥ R¯p,l, l ∈ L (10c)
log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)
≤ z, kp ∈ Kp (10d)
(8c) (10e)
where t , {tg} and z are the maximum allowable rate for Eve
to wiretap the information from the ST and PT, respectively.
The equivalence of (8) and (10) can be easily confirmed by
justifying that the constraint (10b) must hold with equality at
optimum.
Based on the above setting and the assumptions in Section
II. C, the optimization problem P.1 can be reformulated as
P.2 : maximize
w,U,t,z,ϕ
ϕ (11a)
s. t. log2
(
1 + Γs,mg(w,U)
)
−tg ≥ ϕ, ∀mg, ∀g (11b)
max
gkg ,fkg
log2
(
1 + Γe,kg (w,U)
)
≤ tg, ∀kg, ∀g (11c)
min
∆fl∈Ωl
log2
(
1 + Γp,l(w,U)
)
−z ≥ R¯p,l, ∀l (11d)
max
gkp ,fkp
log2
(
1 + Γe,kp(w,U)
)
≤ z, ∀kp (11e)
(8c). (11f)
where ϕ is newly introduced variable. Observe that the ob-
jective function is monotonic in its argument, therefore, we
now only deal with the nonconvex constraints (11b)-(11e).
Let us treat the constraint (11b) first. As the first step, (4)
is equivalently rewritten by
Γs,mg(w,U) =
∣∣hHmgwg∣∣2
χs,mg (w,U)
(12)
where
χs,mg (w,U) =
G∑
i=1,i6=g
|hHmgwi|
2+‖hHmgU‖
2+Pp|fmg |
2+σ2mg .
From (12), it follows that
ln
(
1 +
|hHmgwg|
2
χs,mg (w,U)
)
= − ln
(
1−
|hHmgwg|
2
χs,mg (w,U) + |h
H
mgwg|
2
)
.
(13)
From the fact that 0 ≤
|hHmgwg|
2
χs,mg (w,U)+|h
H
mg
wg |2
, Φ(w,U) < 1,
the function − ln
(
1 − Φ(w,U)
)
is jointly convex w.r.t. the
involved variables [15], which is useful for developing an
approximate solution for (13). In particular, at feasible point(
w(n),U(n)
)
, we have2
− ln
(
1−
|hHmgwg|
2
χs,mg (w,U) + |h
H
mgwg|
2
)
≥
− ln
(
1−
|hHmgw
(n)
g |2
χs,mg (w
(n),U(n)) + |hHmgw
(n)
g |2
)
− Γs,mg
(
w(n),U(n)
)
+ 2
ℜ
{
(w
(n)
g )Hhmgh
H
mgwg
}
χs,mg (w
(n),U(n))
−
Γs,mg
(
w(n),U(n)
)(
χs,mg (w,U) + |h
H
mgwg|
2
)
(
χs,mg (w
(n),U(n)) + |hHmgw
(n)
g |2
)
:= F (n)mg (w,U). (14)
Note that F
(n)
mg (w,U) is convex and is global lower bound of
− ln
(
1 − Φ(w,U)
)
. Therefore, the following equality holds
2Hereafter, suppose the value of (w,U) at the (n + 1)-th iteration in an
iterative algorithm presented shortly is denoted by (w(n),U(n)).
at optimum
F (n)mg (w
(n),U(n)) =
− ln
(
1−
|hHmgw
(n)
g |2
χs,mg(w
(n),U(n)) + |hHmgw
(n)
g |2
)
.
(15)
It implies that we can iteratively replace− ln
(
1−Φ(w,U)
)
by
F
(n)
mg (w
(n),U(n)) to achieve a convex approximation of (11b)
[16]. Hence, by substituting (12), (13), and (14) to (11b), we
have
F (n)mg (w,U) ≥ (ϕ+ tg) ln 2. (16)
It is now clear that the difficulty in solving (11) is due to
(11c)-(11e) since the remaining constraints are convex and
approximate convex. Instead of this, we can find a sub-optimal
solution of (11) as follows
maximize
w,U,t,z,ϕ,φ,α,β
ϕ (17a)
s. t. log2
(
1 + φg
)
≤ tg, g ∈ G (17b)
Pr
(
max
kg∈Ke,g
Γe,kg (w,U) ≤ φg
)
≥ ǫg, g ∈ G (17c)
log2
(
1 + αl
)
−z ≥ R¯p,l, l ∈ L (17d)
min
∆fl∈Ωl
Γp,l(w,U) ≥ αl, l ∈ L (17e)
log2
(
1 + β
)
≤ z (17f)
Pr
(
max
kp∈Kp
Γe,kp(w,U) ≤ β
)
≥ ǫ˜ (17g)
(8c), (11b) (17h)
where φ = {φg}, α = {αl}, and β are newly introduced
variables. The constraint (17e) is imposed to ensure that for
a given CSI error set Ωl, the minimum received SINR at the
l-th PR is larger than the minimum SINR requirement αl for
the PR. According to (17c) and (17g), the probabilities that
the maximum received SINR at the kg-th passive Eve and at
the kp-th Eve are less than φg > 0 and β > 0 are ensured to
be greater than ǫg and ǫ˜, respectively.
We are now in position to expose the hidden convexity of the
constraint of (17c), (17e), and (17g). Since U does not require
a rank-constraint matrix, we introduce U˜ , UUH to facilitate
the optimization problem. Let us handle the constraint (17e)
first by rewriting as
max
∆fl∈Ωl
∑G
g=1
|fHl wg|
2 + tr(fHl U˜fl) + σ
2
l ≤
Pp|hl|
2
αl
.(18)
For arbitrary l-th PR, (18) can be shaped to take the following
equivalent form
G∑
g=1
µl,g + µ˜l + σ
2
l ≤
Pp|hl|
2
αl
, l ∈ L (19)
max
∆fl∈Ωl
|fHl wg|
2 ≤ µl,g, l ∈ L, g ∈ G (20)
max
∆fl∈Ωl
tr(fHl U˜fl) ≤ µ˜l, l ∈ L (21)
where µl = {µl,g} and µ˜ = {µ˜l} are new variables. Note that
both sides of (19) are convex, so it is iteratively replaced by
the following linear constraint
G∑
g=1
µl,g + µ˜l + σ
2
l ≤
2Pp|hl|
2
α
(n)
l
−
Pp|hl|
2
(α
(n)
l )
2
αl, l ∈ L. (22)
To make the tractable form of (20) and (21), we first transform
these constraints into a matrix inequality. Substituting fl =
fˆl +∆fl, ∀l into (20) and applying S-Procedure [15], then
∆fHl ∆fl − δ
2
l ≤ 0
⇒ (20) : ∆fHl wgw
H
g ∆fl + 2ℜ{fˆ
H
l wgw
H
g ∆fl}
+ fˆHl wgw
H
g fˆl − µl,g ≤ 0
(23)
holds if and only if there exists ωl = {ωl,g ≥ 0}, ∀l, so that
the matrix inequality constraint holds as[
ωl,gIN −wgwHg −wgw
H
g fˆl
−fˆHl wgw
H
g −fˆ
H
l wgw
H
g fˆl − ωl,gδ
2
l + µl,g
]
 0.
(24)
However, (24) is still not in a tractable form. At this point,
we apply the application of Schur’s complement lemma [17,
Eq. (7.2.6)] to obtain the following linear matrix inequality
(LMI)
∃ωl,g ≥ 0 : Cl,g(wg, µl,g, ωl,g) , 1 wHg −wHg fˆlwg ωl,gIN
−fˆHl wg −ωl,gδ
2
l + µl,g
  0, g ∈ G, l ∈ L.
(25)
It is also worth noting that constraint (25) now includes only
a finite number of constraints.
Analogously, with ω˜ = {ω˜l ≥ 0}, the constraint (21)
admits the following representation
∃ω˜l ≥ 0 : C˜l(U˜, µ˜l, ω˜l)
,
[
ω˜lIN − U˜ −U˜fˆl
−fˆHl U˜ −fˆ
H
l U˜fˆl − ω˜lδ
2
l + µ˜l
]
 0, l ∈ L.
(26)
To deal with the nonconvex constraints given in (17g) and
(17c), we provide the following two lemmas, whose proofs
are omitted due to space limitations.
Lemma 1: For the primary system, the constraint in (17g)
is lower bounded by the following constraint
λmin
(∑G
g=1
wgw
H
g + U˜
)
≥ ξ˜(β) (27)
where ξ˜(β) ,
(
exp
(
− βNPp σ
2
kp
)
/(1− ǫ˜1/Kp)1/N − 1
)
Pp
β and
λmin(X) denotes the minimum eigenvalue of matrix X.
Next, we rewrite (27) equivalently in the form of
2 ln η + β
σ2kp
NPp
≥ 0 (28)(
η2/(1− ǫ˜1/Kp)1/N − 1
)
Pp ≤ βθ (29)
λmin
(∑G
g=1
wgw
H
g + U˜
)
≥ θ (30)
where θ and η are newly introduced variables. We now focus
on the nonconvex constraint. For the nonconvex constraint
(30), we note that both
∑G
g=1wgw
H
g and U˜ are Hermitian
matrices. In addition, the eigenvalues of a Hermitian matrix
Q are real and satisfy tr(xHQHx) ≥ λ‖x‖2 for any given
vector x if and only if λmin(Q) ≥ λ. Since λmin(wgwHg ) = 0
for all g, the lower bound of right side of (30) is given by
λmin
(∑G
g=1
wgw
H
g + U˜
)
≥ λmin(U˜). (31)
From (30), it follows that
λmin(U˜) ≥ θ ⇔ U˜  INθ. (32)
Lemma 2: For the secondary system, the constraint in
(17c) is lower bounded by the following constraint
‖wg‖
2
φg
≤ ξg +
∑G
i=1,i6=g
‖wi‖
2 + λmin(U˜), g ∈ G (33)
where ξg ,
[
exp
(
σ2kg
NPp
)
ǫ
−1/NKg
g − 1
]
Pp.
The formulation in (33) can be further shaped to take the
following convex constraints
‖wg‖2
φg
≤ ξg +
∑G
i=1,i6=g
2ℜ{(w
(n)
i )
Hwi}
−
∑G
i=1,i6=g
‖w
(n)
i ‖
2 + ϑ, g ∈ G (34)
λmin(U˜) ≥ ϑ⇔ U˜  INϑ (35)
where ϑ is newly introduced variable.
With the above discussions, the approximate convex prob-
lem solved at (n + 1)-th iteration of the proposed design is
given by
maximize
w,U˜0,t,z,ϕ,φ,α,
β,µl,µ˜,ωl,ω˜,θ,η,ϑ
ϕ (36a)
s. t. F (n)mg (w, U˜) ≥ (ϕ+ tg) ln 2, mg ∈ Sg, g ∈ G (36b)∑G
g=1
‖wg‖
2 + tr(U˜) ≤ Ps (36c)
(17b), (17d), (17f), (22), (25),
(26), (28), (29), (32), (34), (35). (36d)
To find an initial feasible point to (11), we solve the following
convex optimization problem
max
w,U˜0,z,α,β,
µl,µ˜,ωl,ω˜,θ,η
min
l∈L
{
log2
(
1 + αl
)
−z − R¯p,l
}
(37a)
s. t. (17f), (22), (25), (26), (28), (29), (32), (36c) (37b)
and stop at reaching: minl∈L
{
log2
(
1 + αl
)
−z − R¯p,l
}
≥ 0.
The proposed iterative method is outlined in Algorithm
1. We can show that Algorithm 1 yields a nondecreasing
sequence of the objective value due to updating the involved
variables after each iteration, which converges to a KKT point
[16].
Complexity Analysis: The optimization problem in (36)
involves GL LMI constraints of size N + 2, L LMI con-
straints of size N + 1, and 2 LMI constraints of size N .
In each iteration of Algorithm 1, the worst-case compu-
tational complexity for solving the generic convex prob-
lem in (36) using interior point methods is given by
O
(
n
√
GL(N + 2) + L(N + 1) + 2N
[
GL(N+2)3+L(N+
1)3 + 2N3 + nGL(N + 2)2 + nL(N + 1)2 + 2nN2 + n2
])
,
where n = G(L + 3) +N(N +G) + 2L+ 6 [18].
Algorithm 1 The proposed iterative algorithm to solve (11)
Initialization: Set n := 0 and solve (37) to generate an initial
feasible point
(
w(n), U˜(n),α(n)
)
1: repeat
2: Solve (36) to obtain the optimal solution:
(
w∗, U˜∗,α∗).
3: Update w(n+1) := w∗, U˜(n+1) := U˜∗, and α(n+1) :=
α∗.
4: Set n := n+ 1.
5: until Convergence or maximum required number of iter-
ations
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Figure 2. Convergence results of Algorithm 1 for different numbers of
antennas at the ST over one random channel realization with R¯p = 2 bps/Hz
and Ps = 15 dBm.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The number of groups of SUs is set to G = 2, each of which
consists of two SR users, i.e.,Mg = 2, ∀g. The number of PR
is set to L = 2, and each group of SUs and PUs is surrounded
by two Eves, i.e., Kp = Kg = 2. All channel entries are
assumed to be i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with
CN (0, 1), and the background thermal noise at each user is
generated as i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with
zero means and unit variance. The transmit power at the PT
is fixed to Pp = 20 dBm. For simplicity, we further assume
that the minimum secrecy rate requirement for all PUs are
the same, i.e., R¯p,l = R¯p, ∀l. For the imperfect CSI of the
PU channels, we define the normalized channel estimation
errors as δ¯2l = δ
2
l /‖fl‖
2 = 5%, ∀l. To guarantee secure
communications, we choose ǫ˜ = 0.99 and ǫg = 0.99, ∀g for
the passive Eves.
Fig. 2 illustrates the typical convergence behavior of the
proposed Algorithm 1. As seen, the objective value of the
proposed algorithm increases rapidly within the first 10 it-
erations and stabilize after a few more iterations, and its
convergence rate is slightly sensitive to the problem size
i.e., as N increases. The convergence results also confirm
that all optimization variables are accounted to find a better
solution for the next iteration, i.e., the secrecy rates of SUs
monotonically increasing.
We compare the performance of the proposed scheme with
the known solutions, namely the “No JN scheme” [8] and
“JN-aided scheme (non-robust)”. In “No JN scheme”, we set
U to 0. For the non-robust secrecy rate design, we use the
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Figure 3. Average secrecy rate of the secondary system vs. the transmit
power at the ST, where R¯p = 1 bps/Hz and N = 8.
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Figure 4. CDF of secrecy rate of the secondary system for different schemes,
where R¯p = 1 bps/Hz, N = 8, and Ps = 20 dBm.
presumed CSIs as fˆl, ∀l rather than the true ones, to perform
the transmit design, which then evaluates the resultant secrecy
rate. Fig. 3 depicts the secrecy rate as a function of the transmit
power at the ST. As can be observed that the secrecy rate of
non-robust design is sensitive to the CSI uncertainties for high
Ps. In particular, when Ps ≥ 8 dBm, the non-robust design
exhibits the degradation in terms of the secrecy rate that tends
to worsen as Ps increases. Moreover, the proposed optimal
design achieves the best secrecy rate performance, compared
to the other designs.
Finally, we generate cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the secrecy rate of the secondary system in Fig. 4 for
different schemes. It is obvious in CDF that on account for a
larger feasible set, the proposed optimal scheme can promise
a bigger secrecy rate as expected. For instance, the proposed
optimal scheme attains 0.8 bps/Hz and 2.8 bps/Hz of the
achievable secrecy rate higher than the non-robust scheme and
“No JN scheme”, respectively, for approximately 60% of the
simulated trials.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed PHY security for both
primary and secondary systems in the presence of the multiple
secondary receiver groups and multiple primary receivers. The
main objective is to maximize the secrecy rate of the secondary
system, while the secondary transmitter is constrained not
only by power constraint, but also by the individual the
minimum secrecy rate requirements of the primary users. We
have proposed iterative algorithms to solve the optimization
problem based on a convex formulation in each iteration. We
have carried out simulation to evaluate the advantages of the
proposed design.
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